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Harrison v Ramparts, Inc., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 65 (Oct. 28, 2021)1 
 
REQUIREMENT OF COMPETING JUDGMENTS FOR AN OFFSET TO APPLY 
 




This is an appeal from a personal injury matter that resulted in a post-judgment district 
court order that awarded attorney fees and costs, and directed that the award payment come from 
settlement funds of the codefendant. The appeal was originally resolved in an unpublished order, 
but the appellant filed a motion to publish the order as an opinion, and the Nevada Court of Appeals 
granted the motion. The district court ordered that the award would come from settlement funds 
of codefendant Desert Medical Equipment and that they would be obligated to pay Harrison based 
on their settlement agreement. However, the court’s offset guaranteed that Luxor would receive 
its attorney fees and costs before Harrison received settlement funds from Desert Medical. The 
Nevada Court of Appeals considered whether the district court erred in offsetting Harrison’s 
settlement funds from a Desert Medical Equipment in order to first satisfy Luxor’s judgment for 
attorney fees and costs. The Nevada Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred, and 
they reverse and remanded. Additionally, Harrison challenged the fees award, which this Court 
affirmed.  
I.  
Harrison was driving a motorized scooter inside the Luxor Hotel and Casino. Members of 
her party moved tables to create a pathway so she could navigate through the restaurant. While 
this took place, one of the scooter’s back tires rolled over the base of a table, and her scooter tipped 
over. This resulted in serious personal injuries for Harrison, including a fractured hip and stroke. 
Harrison filed a complaint against Ramparts, Inc. (Luxor) and Desert Medical (of whom she rented 
the scooter). Luxor offered Harrison $1,000 which Harrison rejected, and the matter proceeded to 
trial. During trial, Harrison and Desert Medical agreed upon a high-low settlement agreement. 
Desert Medical agreed to pay Harrison $150,000 even if the court entered judgement in its favor. 
At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for Desert Medical and Luxor, and found that 
neither was negligent or liable.  
 
After the judgment, Luxor moved for attorney fees and costs, pursuant to NRS Chapter 18 
and NRCP 68 and the motion was granted in part, with a slight reduction in expert costs and 
attorney fees. The district court also offset Luxor’s award of fees and costs from the settlement 
funds Desert Medical owed Harrison. Harrison filed a motion to reconsider due to the issue of 
offset never properly being before the court since Luxor failed to request offset. The district court 
denied this motion. Both Harrison and Luxor were attempting to collect the $150,000 from Desert 
Medical, and Desert Medical filed a motion to interplead the funds. This motion was granted and 
the district court ordered the funds should be distributed to the Luxor first, and then Harrison and 
her attorneys. Harrison appealed, arguing that the district court erred in offsetting the settlement 




1  By Anna Dreibelbis. 
II.  
  The court’s reliance on Muije, was improper. In Muije, the plaintiff prevailed at trial, but 
the jury award in plaintiff’s favor was less than the defendant’s offer of judgment.2 Both parties 
had judgment against each other, so the district court determined it would offset the plaintiff’s 
judgment from the amount she owed the defendant.3 The plaintiff’s attorney appealed, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed since the attorney’s lien was attached to the net judgment, which was 
zero.4 Here, the court declines to extend Muije to this case as the Desert Medical funds were part 
of a settlement agreement that did not include Luxor, and the district court did not reduce the 
settlement to judgment in favor of Harrison. Therefore, the district court erred in granting an offset 
where Luxor and Harrison did not have mutually owed judgements that could subject them to 
offset. The order is reversed as to the offset. As to the Desert Medical settlement funds, it is 
remanded in order to release the interpleaded funds to Harrison.  
III.  
 Next, the appellate court addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding Luxor its fees. Harrison uses NRCP 68 to argue there are inconsistencies between the 
district court’s statements at the hearing and those contained in the order. Contrastingly, Luxor 
argues that the district court considered the Beattie factors and therefore did not abuse its 
discretion. There are four factors the court must weigh in determining whether to award attorney 
fees: (1) Whether the plaintiff’s claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants’ offer 
of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the 
plaintiff’s decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; 
and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount.5 All factors 
should be considered appropriately. The Court considered these factors and decided that they 
weighed in favor of awarding attorney fees. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in using these factors to determine the amount of fees to award and this is affirmed.  
IV.   
A party cannot make a claim for attorney fees and costs against settlement funds from a 
third party that have not been reduced to a judgement, and therefore, the district court cannot offset 
these funds. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the award for attorney fees and reversed the 
district court’s order as to the offset. It is remanded for the release of the interpleaded funds.  
 
Gibbons, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
  
Chief Justice Gibbons concludes that the district court’s order is not legally sufficient. He 
argues that the attorney fees should be vacated, and the case should be remanded to the district 
curt to engage in the correct process for these proceedings. There is not a valid basis to award 
attorney fees, and therefore the district court order should be vacated. However, Chief Justice 
Gibbons agrees with the majority as to the remaining issues and concurs with the aspect of the 
opinion that reverses and remands to correct the offset.  
  
 
2  Muije v. A North Las Vegas Cab Company, Inc., 106 Nev. 664, 665 (1990), 799 P.2d 559, 559–60 (1990). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 666–67, 799 P.2d at 560.  
5  Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588–89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983).  
Chief Justice Gibbons reasoned that the district court failed to correctly apply the first three 
factors in the Beattie test.6 He argues that although the district court mentioned the factors in its 
order, it only summarily found that an award of attorney fees and costs were appropriate according 
to the factors. This fails to address the content of the first three elements. This is a fact-intensive 
inquiry and the court made no findings that the case was brought in bad faith, that the $1,000 offer 
was reasonable and in good faith, or that it was grossly unreasonable for Harrison to reject the 
offer. Lacking these findings within the court order, it is impossible to understand how the court 
balanced these factors. Chief Justice Gibbons contends that the district court focused solely on the 
fourth factor, which should not have been addressed until the others were considered and balanced 
against each other.  
  
He further notes that the first three factors in the Beattie test involve a qualitative analysis 
which makes it case-specific. For factor one, the court needed to show that there was good faith 
on the part of the plaintiff when the complaint was filed. It is irrelevant that the complaint was 
found to be unmeritorious as to Luxor—it just required good faith. In terms of the second factor, 
the district court failed to address the good-faith threshold questions, and further made no mention 
of the timing being reasonable. Assuming the court did find the timing reasonable, the amount 
offered would then need to be evaluated and found reasonable. These findings were incomplete. 
As to the third factor, it required an objective and subjective analysis of the plaintiff’s reaction to 
the offer. Here, Luxor would have had to demonstrate that it was grossly unreasonable or in bad 
faith that Harrison did not accept the offer in the 10-day period. The district court failed to make a 
written finding or legal conclusion regarding this factor.  
  
Although the district court found one factor that favored Luxor, they failed to use the other 
three factors to correctly analyze the case. Therefore, Chief Justice Gibbons concluded that the 
district court abused its discretion by lacking the proper consideration for the first, second, and 
third Beattie factors, and in their explanations with the connections between the factors. He would 
suggest a remand to apply each of the factors. He concurs in part and dissents in part, and would 
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